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I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent profile article, Kent Sluyter, Chief Executive Officer
of Prudential Individual Life Insurance, likened the present state of the
life insurance industry to his Alaskan white water rafting experience.'
Although the industry previously enjoyed "calm water" and the ability
to "see a great distance . . . and set a course from point A to point B
without having to worry," the past several years have disrupted the
market in many respects.2 Among the most worrisome shifts, according
to Sluyter, is regulatory uncertainty. 3 Sluyter acknowledged that some
companies facing these changes fear that they "don't have the right
craft" and are "pulling out of the white water."4 On the other hand, he
suggested that "shooting the rapids" brings a surge of energy and
excitement that will propel those who take the plunge.s Soon after the
interview, Prudential indeed took a plunge into uncharted territory;
however, its course sought to avoid the regulatory "white water" and to
maintain the status quo. 6
On July 2, 2013, Prudential Financial, Inc. (Prudential) became
the first company to challenge the Financial Stability Oversight
Council's (FSOC) proposed determination to designate it as a nonbank
systemically important financial institution (SIFI).7 One month earlier






6. See Prudential Financial, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 2, 2013) (giving
notice that Prudential will challenge the FSOC's proposed SIFI designation).
7. See id.; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5311(a)(4)(B)(ii), 5311(a)(6), 5323(a)(1) (2012) (defining a
systemically important "nonbank financial company" as a company predominantly engaged
in financial activities whose material financial distress or whose nature, scope, size, scale,
concentration, or interconnectedness "could pose a threat to the financial stability of the
United States").
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the FSOC had issued its first nonbank SIFI designations to American
International Group, Inc. (AIG), GE Capital Corporation (GE Capital),
and Prudential.8 AIG and GE Capital accepted their designations, 9
subjecting the companies to supervision by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) and heightened
regulation under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).' 0 Prudential, on the other hand, requested
an oral hearing "to demonstrate that [it is] not a systemically important
nonbank financial institution."" Given the potentially enormous shift
in oversight that will most likely saddle nonbank SIFI designees, the
mechanics and the outcome of the hearing "could have significant
bearing on how regulators proceed with future designations."l 2 As many
expected, the FSOC upheld its proposed designation of Prudential."
This Note will discuss issues concerning the hearing process and
procedure as well as certain rationales for the FSOC's designations and
8. See FIN. OVERSIGHT STABILITY COUNCIL, BASIS OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL'S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL
GROUP, INC. 1 (2013) [hereinafter AIG FINAL DETERMINATION]; see also FIN. OVERSIGHT
STABILITY COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL'S FINAL
DETERMINATION REGARDING GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORPORATION, INC. 1 (2013)
[hereinafter GE CAPITAL FINAL DETERMINATION]; FIN. OVERSIGHT STABILITY COUNCIL,
BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL'S FINAL DETERMINATION
REGARDING PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC.. 1 (2013) [hereinafter PRUDENTIAL FINAL
DETERMINATION].
9. See AIG FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 1; see also GE CAPITAL FINAL
DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 1; Donna Borak, FSOC Names AIG, GE Capital as
Systemic Institutions, Am. BANKER, July 9, 2013,
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/17813 1/fsoc-names-aig-ge-capital-as-systemic-
institutions- 1060477-1 .html.
10. See 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1); see also Danielle Douglas, Council Identifies Non-
Bank Financial Companies for Additional Supervision, WASH. POST, June 3, 2013,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-03/business/39712911_1_financial-stability-
oversight-council-financial-system-firms.
11. Michael R. Crittenden & Leslie Scism, Prudential Hits Back on Risk Status, WALL
ST. J., July 21, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324263404578616204239219348.html
(quoting Prudential spokesman Bob DeFillippo).
12. Danielle Douglas, Prudential Enters Uncharted Legal Realm by Appealing its
Regulatory Label, WASH. POST, July 3, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-
03/business/40351542_I-prudential-financial-financial-stability-oversight-council-fsoc.
13. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTATIONAL VOTE (September 19, 2013);
see also Louie Woodall, Prudential Financial SIFIAppeal 'Futile,' RISK.NET (July 5, 2013)
http://www.risk.net/insurance-risk/news/2279791/prudential-fmancial-sifi-appeal-futile
("[The hearing] could be viewed as a futile effort." (quoting Don Lamson)); Douglas, supra
note 12 ("The three-step process of examination was so lengthy and detailed that it may be
difficult for Prudential to make its case at this point.").
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how these issues subvert the efficacy of an evidentiary hearing. Part II
provides a background on the FSOC and the method by which it
designates nonbank SIFIs.14 Part III details the process leading to an
evidentiary hearing.' 5 Part IV then identifies some of the key concerns
regarding the hearing procedures with respect to how they might affect
a company's ability to contest a designation. 16 Part V addresses how
substantial portions of the FSOC's analysis of AIG and Prudential
shield highly contested assumptions from a challenge.1 7 Part VI will
conclude by suggesting that despite its faults, a hearing may provide an
opportunity for a designated company to propose industry-tailored
prudential standards to the FSOC.18
II. DODD-FRANK AND SIFIS, THE FSOC, AND THE DESIGNATION PROCESS
Dodd-Frank provides that SIFIs should receive enhanced
supervision by the Federal Reserve under the heightened standards.19
Bank holding companies with at least $50 billion in assets are
automatically held to these more stringent standards. 20 Also, nonbank
financial companies may be designated as SIFIs under certain
conditions, subjecting them to the same supervision from the Federal
Reserve and the heightened standards as bank holding companies. 2 1 A
"financial company" under Dodd-Frank is any company with at least 85
percent of annual gross revenues or consolidated assets that are derived
or related to financial activities as defined by the Bank Holding
Company Act.22 To identify which nonbank financial companies are
SIFIs, Dodd-Frank established the FSOC.23
The FSOC consists of the heads of the major federal regulatory
agencies, an independent member, and representatives from state
regulators.24 The voting members include: the Secretary of the
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infra Part VI.
19. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a)(1)(A) (2012).
20. See id. § 5365(a)(1).
21. See id.
22. Id. §§ 5311(a)(4)(B), (a)(6)(A)
23. Id. § 5322(a)(2)(H).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1).
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Treasury, who also serves as the Chairperson of the FSOC; the
Chairman of the Board Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the
Comptroller of the Currency; the Director of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau; the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission; the Chairperson of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation; the Chairperson of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission; the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency; the
Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board; and an
independent member appointed by the President. 25 The FSOC also has
several nonvoting members. 2 6  Dodd-Frank requires a two-thirds
supermajority of the voting members, as well as the vote of the
Chairperson, to designate a financial company as a nonbank SIFI.27
To determine which financial companies it should designate, the
FSOC conducts a three-stage analysis.28 Stage 1 is entirely quantitative
with certain threshold limits explicitly defined. A company must meet
these thresholds or it will not qualify as a nonbank SIFI. 29 The FSOC
examines a company's total consolidated assets, which must exceed $50
billion; its credit default swaps outstanding, which must exceed $30
billion; its derivatives liabilities, which must exceed $3.5 billion; total
debt outstanding, which must exceed $20 billion; its leverage ratio of
total consolidated assets to total equity, which must exceed 15 to 1; and
its short term debt ratio of total debt outstanding with a maturity of less
than 12 months to total consolidated assets, which must exceed 10
percent. 30
With a pool of potential designees narrowed, the FSOC
conducts both quantitative and qualitative analysis in Stage 2.3 1 The
FSOC focuses on six categories for each company: (1)
interconnectedness, (2) substitutability, (3) size, (4) leverage, (5)
liquidity risk and maturity mismatch, and (6) existing regulatory
25. Id. §§ 5321(b)(1)(A)-(J)
26. Id. § 5321(b)(2) (stating that the nonvoting members include the Director of the
Office of Financial Research, the Director of the Federal Insurance Office, a State insurance
commissioner, a State banking supervisor, and a State securities commissioner).
27. Id. § 5323(a)(1).
28. Id. § 5322(a)(2)(H); see also Financial Stability Oversight Council Guidance for
Nonbank Financial Company Determinations, 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A at 359 (2013).
29. 12C.F.R.§ 1310app.Aat 360.
30. Id. § 1310 app. A at 359-61.
31. Id. § 1310 app. A at 362.
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scrutiny. 32  The FSOC also begins a preliminary examination of
"whether the resolution of a nonbank financial company . .. could pose
a threat to the U.S. financial stability." 33
Once a company reaches Stage 3, the FSOC issues a "Notice of
Consideration" informing the company of its status and requesting
detailed information for further review.34 The FSOC focuses on the
central issue of "whether the nonbank financial company could pose a
threat to U.S. financial stability because of the company's material
financial distress or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration,
interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the company."3 The
FSOC uses the six categories from Stage 2 as its analytical framework,
within which there are ten statutory considerations. 36 Also, the FSOC
analyzes a company's risk in the context of "transmission channels."37
The two primary transmission channels, through which a company
could transmit its material financial distress to the broader financial
system, are "exposure" and "asset liquidation."38  Exposure
encompasses the financial company's creditors, counterparties,
investors, and other market participants that "have exposure to the
nonbank financial company that is significant enough to materially
impair" those parties.39  Asset liquidation considers the effect of a
nonbank financial company rapidly liquidating its assets, causing a
dramatic fall in asset prices and significantly disrupting trading or
funding in markets. 40 Additionally, the FSOC continues to analyze how
complex and difficult a company's resolvability would be in the event
32. Id. § 1310 app. A at 356-59, 362.
33. Id. § 1310 app. A at 362.
34. 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A at 362.
35. Id.
36. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2) (2012) (naming (1) the extent of the leverage; (2) the extent
and nature of off-balance-sheet exposures; (3) the extent and nature of the transactions and
relationships with other significant financial companies; (4) the importance of the company
as a source of credit; (5) the extent to which assets are managed rather than owned by the
company; (6) the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, and interconnectedness of the
company; (7) the extent to which the company is regulated; (8) the amount and nature of the
company's financial assets; (9) the amount and types of the company's liabilities; and(10)
any other risk-related factors as the statutory factors); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A at
362.
37. 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A at 362.
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that the company failed.41
After Stage 3, the FSOC votes on a "proposed determination"
for any company it determines should be designated as nonbank SIFIs.42
A proposed determination requires a two-thirds majority including the
vote of the Chairperson.43 The FSOC must provide the company with a
written notice, and the company may request a hearing to challenge its
designation.44 Whether or not the company challenges its designation,
the FSOC will vote on a "final determination," which also requires a
two-thirds majority and the vote of the Chairperson.45 If the company
decides to challenge its designation further, it must do so in a federal
district court.46
III. PURPOSE AND PROCESS OF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
When the FSOC issued the first proposed designations on June
3, 2013, it exercised an extraordinary power to make nonbank SIFI
designations.47 Nonbank SIFIs, many for the first time, will be subject
to oversight by the Federal Reserve and regulations that include capital
requirements, leverage limits, liquidity requirements, resolution plans or
living wills, credit exposure report requirements, concentration limits,
contingent capital requirements, public disclosures, short-term debt
limits, and other risk management requirements that the FSOC may
recommend to the Federal Reserve.48 Potential nonbank SIFI designees
argue that the new standards are unsuitable for nonbank business
models such as insurance and that the impact is difficult to measure
given the lack of specificity of the standards. 49  The only avenue to
41. Id. § 1310 app. A at 362-63.
42. See 12 U.S.C. § 5323(e)(1) (2012); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A at 363.
43. 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A at 363. As a reminder, the Chairperson is the Secretary of
the Treasury.
44. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5323(e)(1)-(2).
45. Id. §§ 5323(a)(1), (e)(3).
46. Id. § 5323(h).
47. See generally Danielle Douglas, Council Identifies Non-bank Financial Companies
for Additional Supervision, THE WASH. POST, June 3, 2013,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-03/business/39712911_1_financial-stability-
oversight-council-financial-system-firms ("[The designation] sets the stage for a major shift
in the oversight of a broad swath of big companies.").
48. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5324-5325(b)(1).
49. See Letter from Alexander G. Acree et al, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, FSOC
Designation: Consequences for Nonbank SIFIS 1 (April 11, 2013) ("The Federal Reserve
did not, however, discuss in greater detail how it would adapt such standards."); see also
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avoid application of the standards and the accompanying uncertainty of
the new regulations is to request an evidentiary hearing before the
FSOC.so
A. What Is the Purpose of an Evidentiary Hearing?
A company receiving a proposed designation as a nonbank SIFI
"may request, in writing, an opportunity for a written or oral hearing
before the [FSOC] to contest the proposed determination."' The
central issue for the hearing is whether the company can demonstrate
that it would not threaten the financial stability of the United States
through either "material financial distress at the nonbank financial
company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration,
interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the nonbank financial
company."5 2 This hearing is the company's only opportunity after a
proposed determination to convince the FSOC that it does not pose a
systemic risk to the financial system.53 If a company succeeds, it will
most likely remain in Stage 2 of the FSOC's three-stage designation
process; 54 otherwise the company must accept the FSOC's designation
and future regulation by the Federal Reserve or challenge the
designation in federal court.
B. Process Leading to an Evidentiary Hearing Under Dodd-Frank
The first notice that a company receives from the FSOC advises
that the FSOC is reviewing the company under its Stage 3 criteria and is
Steven A. Kandarian, Chairman, President, & CEO, MetLife, Inc., Life Insurers as SIFIs: A
Case of Mistaken Identity?, Keynote Address at U.S. Chamber of Commerce Capital
Markets Summit (April 10, 2013) ("[N]o amount of 'tailoring' will ever make bank capital
standards fit a life insurer's balance sheet.").
50. See 12 U.S.C. § 5323(e)(2).
51. Id.
52. 12 C.F.R. § 1310.21(c) (2013).
53. See 12 U.S.C. § 5323(e)(2).
54. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTATIONAL VOTE, VIEWS OF THE ACTING
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY at 1 (2013) [hereinafter FHFA
DIRECTOR'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION] (stating that there is an
"understanding that the company would remain in Stage 2" if the FSOC did not finalize the
designation after the hearing).
55. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5323(e)(3)-(h).
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considering a proposed designation. 56 At this point, the company may
submit written materials to the FSOC explaining why it does not pose a
systemic risk to the financial stability of the United States. Regardless,
the company most likely has to submit information to the FSOC
because a Stage 3 review also allows the FSOC to request information
from the company through the Office of Financial Research, including
"confidential business information such as internal assessments, internal
risk management procedures, funding details, counterparty exposure or
position data, strategic plans, resolvability, potential acquisitions or
dispositions, and other anticipated changes to the nonbank financial
company's business or structure."5 While the FSOC has voted against
advancing companies from Stage 2 to Stage 3,5 it appears that the
FSOC has yet to vote against issuing a proposed designation to a
company already considered at Stage 3.59
During a Stage 3 review, the FSOC hears from various agencies,
including the Federal Reserve, the Federal Housing Finance Agency,
and the Treasury Department, regarding the Stage 3 qualitative and
quantitative analysis. 60 Before the FSOC voted on AIG, GE Capital,
and Prudential, it met twice to consider information from the agencies
and once to decide if the evidentiary record was complete. 61 After a
56. 12 C.F.R. § 1310.21(a)(1); see also id. § 1310 app. A at 362 (describing Stage 3
criteria which focuses on channels through which a company may transmit risk and
"information relating to factors that are not easily quantifiable").
57. Id. § 1310 app. A at 362.
58. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A (stating that Stage 3 will focus particularly on
the channels through which the company might transmit its risk and factors that are not
easily quantifiable such as "opacity of the nonbank financial company's operations, its
complexity, and the extent to which it is subject to existing regulatory scrutiny and the
nature of such scrutiny"); see also FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, MINUTES OF
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL HELD JANUARY 21, 2013 (2013).
59. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, MINUTES OF FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL HELD JUNE 3, 2013 (2013) (issuing proposed designations to three
companies in Stage 3 review).
60. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, MINUTES OF FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL HELD APRIL 4, 2013 (2013) (noting representatives from the agencies
were available for questions posed by the FSOC); see also FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL, MINUTES OF FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL HELD JUNE 3, 2013
(2013); FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, MINUTES OF FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL HELD APRIL 25, 2013 (2013).
61. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, RESOLUTION APPROVING THE COMPLETION OF
THE EVIDENTIARY RECORD REGARDING A SET OF NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES (2013);
see also FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, MINUTES OF FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL HELD ON April 25, 2013 (2013); FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, MINUTES OF
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL HELD APRIL 4, 2013 (2013).
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vote that requires a two-thirds majority and the vote of the Chairperson
approving a proposed designation, the FSOC provides a written notice
with an explanation of the proposed designation to the company.62
The company then has thirty days to request a written or oral
evidentiary hearing to contest the proposed designation. Within thirty
days of the request, the FSOC must hold an evidentiary hearing where
the company may appear, personally or through counsel, to submit
written materials.64 The FSOC may, but is not required to, grant a
request for an oral hearing.6 5  The FSOC then has sixty days after the
evidentiary hearing to make a final determination on the designation.66
If the FSOC finalizes the designation, which also requires a two-thirds
majority and the vote of the Chairperson, then it must provide a written
explanation of the basis of the designation.67 The FSOC will also notify
the company at least one day before it publicly announces the
designation. 68
Similar to other administrative processes, a company may
challenge its final designation in federal district court. 69 In reviewing
the final determination of the FSOC, the district court must apply the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard.70 Under this standard, a reviewing
court will "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law."71  This highly deferential
standard favors agencies, and "[c]orporations have not historically been
successful in suing regulators." 72 Perhaps the most significant outcome
of a lawsuit could be access to documents regarding the FSOC's
62. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(e)(1) (2012); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1310.21(b).
63. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(e)(2); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1310.21(c)(1).
64. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(e)(2); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1310.2 1(c)(2).
65. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(e)(2); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1310.21(c)(2).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(e)(3); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1310.21(d)(1).
67. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(e)(3); see also 12 C.F.R. § 1310.21(b)(2).
68. 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A at 363.
69. 12 U.S.C. 5323(h) (stating that a designated company may bring an action in the
United States district court for the judicial district in which the home office of the company
is located or in the District of Columbia).
70. Id. ("Review of such an action shall be limited to whether the final determination
made under this section was arbitrary and capricious.").
71. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
72. Douglas, supra note 12 (citing Daniel Meade, formerly at Hogan Lovells
Internationals LLP and Senior Counsel to the House Committee on Financial Services); see
also Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 506 n.8 (1997) (stating that
the arbitrary and capricious standard under the Administrative Procedure Act is deferential).
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designation process that would otherwise remain closed to the
designated company and the public. 73
IV. KEY CONCERNS RAISED OVER HEARING PROCEDURES
The FSOC approved its hearing procedures on May 22, 2012.74
They detail the manner in which a designated company could obtain a
hearing and the parameters of the hearing. The hearing procedures
prompted four comment letters expressing concern that the procedures
limit the ability of a company to challenge its designation. The
procedural issues raise concern that there is (1) no right to an oral
hearing; (2) no opportunity for discovery; and (3) a lack of information
regarding the appointment and authority of the Hearing Clerk.
A. Companies Have No Right to an Oral Hearing
The FSOC's hearing procedures do not entitle a company to an
oral hearing to contest the proposed designation." Instead, a company
must request an oral hearing with its written hearing request and justify
"why [the FSOC] should exercise its discretion to grant such a
hearing."78  The FSOC retains "sole discretion" to grant a hearing,
which it can only do with a majority vote.79 If the FSOC grants an oral
hearing, the company still must submit written materials contesting the
designation along with a list of individuals appearing and the nature of
their presentations.80  The oral hearing procedures limit these
73. See Douglas, supra note 12.
74. FIN. STABIUTY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, MINUTES OF FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL HELD MAY 22, 2012 (2012).
75. See FIN. OVERSIGHT STABILITY COUNCIL, HEARING PROCEDURES FOR PROCEEDING
UNDER TITLE I OR TITLE VIII OF THE DODD FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT § 5 (2012) [hereinafter THE FSOC HEARING PROCEDURES].
76. See Letter from Michael Bopp, Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, to the
FSOC (July 30, 2012) (on file with author); Letter from Bill Himpler, Exec. Vice President,
American Fin. Servs. Ass'n., to the FSOC (July 30, 2012) (on file with author); Letter from
Richard M. Whiting, Exec. Director & General Counsel, The Fin. Servs. Roundtable, to the
FSOC (July 30, 2012) (on file with author); Letter from Stephen Zielezienski, Senior Vice
President & General Counsel, Am. Ins. Ass'n., to the FSOC (July 30, 2012) (on file with
author).
77. THE FSOC HEARING PROCEDURES, supra note 75, § 5 (stating that the Council
"may, at its sole discretion, grant a request for an oral hearing").
78. THE FSOC HEARING PROCEDURES, supra note 75, § 3(b).
79. Id. § 5.
80. Id. § 5(b)(2).
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representatives to their presentations and answers to follow-up
questions posed by FSOC members; the company's representatives may
not ask any questions of the FSOC or its staff regarding the
designation.8' Additionally, FSOC members are not necessarily
required to attend the hearing-although the hearing is technically
before the FSOC, any FSOC member may select a representative to
conduct the hearing on the member's behalf if approved by a majority
vote of FSOC members. 82
Given the substantial impact on a company's finances,
operations, and reputation that a designation will most likely carry, the
FSOC should grant every request for an oral hearing. However, the
FSOC is likely on firm statutory and constitutional grounds if it were to
deny an oral hearing. Not only does Dodd-Frank expressly state that
oral hearings are at the FSOC's discretion, 84 but the Fourth Circuit also
approved a similar process in Doolin Security Savings Bank, F.S.B. v.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.85 The court held that the
FDIC's risk classification process, which involved "a detailed, expert
evaluation of the financial condition of an institution," satisfied due
process requirements when it guaranteed only a written hearing and left
oral hearings to the FDIC's discretion. 86  Under this analysis, a
constitutional challenge to the FSOC's hearing procedures would likely
fail."
Nevertheless, "sound administrative practice" should compel the
FSOC to hold oral hearings for companies challenging a proposed
designation. Because the FSOC anticipates that only a small number
of companies will receive designations, oral hearings would not burden
the FSOC." Conversely, an FSOC designation will carry a substantial
81. FSOC Hearing Procedures, 78 Fed. Reg. 22,546, 22,547 (Apr. 16, 2013) (codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310) (noting that nothing in Dodd-Frank or the FSOC Hearing Procedures
entitles the petitioner to pose questions to the FSOC during the hearing).
82. THE FSOC HEARING PROCEDURES, supra note 75, § 5(d)(2) (2012).
83. Bopp, supra note 76, at 5; Zielezienski, supra note 76, at 4.
84. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(e)(2) (2012) (stating that an oral hearing may be granted "at the
sole discretion of [the FSOC]").
85. 53 F3d. 1395 (4th Cir. 1995).
86. Id. at 1403.
87. Contra Zielezienski, supra note 76, at 3-4 (suggesting that an oral hearing is
essential for due process).
88. See id. at 5.
89. Regulatory Perspectives on the Obama Administration's Financial Regulatory
Reform Proposals, Part II: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financials Services, 111th
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burden on companies, as designated companies must comply with
significant, yet still undetermined, prudential standards. 90 Given the
complexity and importance of the designation process, which includes a
three-stage analysis and a host of quantitative and qualitative factors, 9'
an oral hearing is critical "to ensuring that a company knows why it is
being considered for potential designation."9 2  While a company
receives an explanation of the proposed designation from the FSOC, the
explanation of AIG's determination was only fourteen pages.93 Such a
short explanation is hardly sufficient for a complex decision with a
potentially enormous impact. Additionally, a designated company has
very limited opportunities to participate in the designation process. 94
Prior to the proposed designation, a company can only submit written
materials contesting the designation along with the information
requested by the FSOC through the Office of Financial Research. 95 An
oral hearing is most likely the only opportunity a company will have to
participate in the designation process "at a meaningful time in a
meaningful manner." 96
These same considerations should also push the FSOC to permit
companies to question FSOC members or their staff.97 Particularly at
Congress 48 (2009) (statement of Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman of the Fed. Reserve) ("I
would not envision the Fed's oversight extending to any significant number of additional
firms."); Bopp, supra note 76, at 5.
90. See 12 U.S.C. § 5325(b)(1) (2012) (stating that new prudential standards may
include risk-based capital requirements, leverage limits, liquidity requirements, resolution
plan and credit exposure and credit requirements, concentration limits, a contingent capital
requirement, enhanced public disclosures, short-term debt limits, and overall risk
management requirements); see also Himpler, supra note 76, at 3; Acree, supra note 49
(noting provisions in Dodd-Frank to which nonbank SIFIs will be subject).
91. See 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A (2013) (providing details of the designation process).
92. Whiting, supra note 76, at 4.
93. See AIG FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8.
94. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 1310.21 (providing only the hearing as a means of
participation for potential designees).
95. See id. § 1310.21(a)(2); see also id. app. A at 362 ("The Notice of Consideration
likely will include a request that the nonbank financial company provide information that
the Council deems relevant to the Council's evaluation, and the nonbank financial company
will be provided an opportunity to submit the written materials to the [FSOC].").
96. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (recognizing that a fundamental
requirement of due process is the "opportunity to be heard" (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234
U.S. 385, 394 (1914)); see Zielezienski, supra note 76, at 4.
97. Zielezienski, supra note 76, at 2; FSOC Hearing Procedures, 78 Fed. Reg. 22,546,
22,547 (Apr. 16, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310) (noting that nothing in Dodd-Frank
or the FSOC Hearing Procedures entitles the petitioner to pose questions to the FSOC
during the hearing).
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Stage 3, the FSOC's analysis is highly qualitative, and the written
explanation describing subjective decisions such as a company's risk to
the financial system through "transmission channels"98 may raise more
questions than it answers. For example, the FSOC states that individual
exposures to AIG through derivatives, repurchase agreements, and
securities lending "may be relatively small, but in the aggregate, the
exposures are large enough that material financial distress at AIG . . .
could have a destabilizing effect on the financial markets." 99 Whatever
the flaws of the analysis may be, 00 it involves "specific financial,
accounting and other risk management considerations" and requires
"not only direct knowledge of the facts, but also specialized
expertise."'o' Surely issuing a sweeping conclusion without disclosing
the supporting evidence behind it will provoke questions by the
company that the explanation leaves unanswered. Therefore, a
company should have the opportunity to question FSOC members and
their staff during the hearing in order to clarify the FSOC's subjective
determinations and ensure that the designation is not based upon faulty
information or analysis.102
Finally, the FSOC should always exercise its discretion in
granting an oral hearing because a written hearing potentially will have
little effect. 03  As previously mentioned, a company may submit
written materials during Stage 3 to contest the designation before it is
made.' 04  Presumably, a company will submit substantially similar
materials in Stage 3 as it would in a written hearing. Since the FSOC
will have already reviewed the materials and rejected the company's
argument against designation, a written hearing will most likely produce
the same result. 05 An oral hearing, on the other hand, would allow a
98. 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A at 356-57 (describing transmission channels as the means
by which a company's financial distress could spread through the financial system;
transmission channels include a company's direct or indirect exposures to counterparties,
total debt outstanding, amount of gross notional credit default swaps, and reinsurance
obligations).
99. AIG FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 7.
100. See infra Part IV.
101. Whiting, supra note 76, at 4.
102. See Zielezienski, supra note 76, at 4.
103. See 12 U.S.C. § 5323(e)(2) (2012) (stating that a company may submit written
materials contesting a designation after being granted an oral hearing); see also Himpler,
supra note 76, at 2.
104. 12 C.F.R. § 1310.21(a)(2) (2013).
105. Himpler, supra note 76, at 2.
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company to present its argument more effectively and persuasively by
establishing a "dialogue between FSOC and a petitioner company" and
providing an opportunity to answer the FSOC's questions and concerns
directly and in person.106
B. There is No Further Discovery Process
The hearing procedures also do not afford the company a right
to discovery regarding the specific data or analysis that the FSOC used
for its proposed designation beyond the explanation accompanying the
notice of proposed designation.' 07 Additionally, the hearing procedures
state that the Administrative Procedure Act, the Federal Rules of
Evidence, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to
FSOC hearings.108  Nothing requires FSOC hearings to permit
discovery even if the FSOC followed the formalities of a hearing under
the Administrative Procedure Act.1 09
While the FSOC is not required to permit discovery or provide
materials regarding the designation, the FSOC should nevertheless
cooperate with a company seeking a more detailed explanation of the
designation. The FSOC does provide a company with a written
explanation of the basis of the proposed designation.o10 However, a
company may still desire more details regarding how the FSOC
interpreted the wealth of data and the factors considered in the
designation process." 1  This might be particularly true for the
106. Id. at 3. This assumes, of course, that the FSOC members will not designate
representatives to conduct hearings.
107. THE FSOC HEARING PROCEDURES, supra note 75, § I ("Nothing in these hearing
procedures shall entitle a petitioner to discovery or other similar rights.").
108. Id. ("The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.)
governing adjudications required by statute to be determined on the record, the Federal
Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C. Appendix), and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28
U.S.C. Rule 1 et seq.), do not apply to the hearings to be conducted by [the FSOC] under
these hearing procedures.").
109. See Kelly v. U.S. E.P.A., 203 F.3d 519, 523 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[T]here is no
constitutional right to pretrial discovery in administrative proceedings."); see also Frilette v.
Kimberlin, 508 F.2d 205, 208 (3rd Cir. 1974) ("The APA contains no provision for pre-trial
discovery in the administrative process and, of course, the provisions of the Federal Rules
Of Civil Procedure for discovery do not apply to administrative proceedings. Therefore, in
the absence of special statutory provision, and in the absence of special administrative
regulation, no procedure for discovery is normally available in a federal administrative
proceeding."' (citation omitted)).
110. See 12 C.F.R. § 1310.21(b) (2013).
I11. See Himpler, supra note 76, at 2.
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qualitative analysis that occurs largely in Stage 3.112 For instance, the
FSOC states in its final explanation for AIG's designation that
AIG also has the potential to transmit material financial
distress to the broader economy through direct and
indirect capital markets exposures. These exposures
include holders of AIG securities, as well as derivatives,
repurchase agreements, and securities lending
counterparties. Individual exposures to AIG may be
relatively small, but in the aggregate, the exposures are
large enough that material financial distress at AIG, if it
were to occur, could have a destabilizing effect on the
financial markets. 1 3
The FSOC's statement covers a broad spectrum of AIG's
financial activities, but it does not specify the data used to analyze that
particular manner of risk transmission. To be sure, the explanation does
include specific data such as its consolidated debt ($48.5 billion), gross
notional derivatives outstanding ($215 billion), net liability for unpaid
claims and claim adjustment expenses ($88 billion), and deposit
contract obligations ($127 billion). 114 Also, since the final explanation
is a public document, the FSOC may be required to keep much of the
information used to make the determination confidential.1 ' Still, a
fourteen-page explanation, part of which simply states the methodology
of the designation process,"16 may not comprehensively address the
questions and concerns a company might have about the three-stage,
six-category, eleven-factor, part objective, part subjective, complex, and
comprehensive designation process.
112. See 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A at 362 ("[D]uring Stage 3, [the FSOC] expects to have
access, to a greater degree than during earlier stages of review, to information relating to
factors that are not easily quantifiable or that may not directly cause a company to pose a
threat to financial stability, but could mitigate or aggravate the potential of a nonbank
financial company to pose a threat to the United States.").
113. AIG FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 7.
114. Id. at 11-13.
115. See 12 C.F.R. § 1310.20(e) (requiring the FSOC to maintain the confidentiality of
any information or data that companies submit and preserving all privileges to which the
data or information is subject).
116. See AIG FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 3-5.
2014] 677
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
C. The Hearing Clerk Plays a Significant Role in the Hearing
Another subtle, yet significant, element of the hearing is the
Hearing Clerk. This individual, appointed by the Treasury Secretary, is
the "central point of contact for the petitioner."'"7 The Hearing Clerk
sets the date and place for the written or oral hearing." 8 Additionally,
the Hearing Clerk is authorized to dictate procedural matters such as
limitations on the quantity of written materials or the duration of an oral
hearing.119 Given the lack of precedent for an FSOC hearing, the
Hearing Clerk has wide discretion in establishing the procedural
parameters of the hearing. For instance, in setting the hearing date, the
Hearing Clerk controls the amount of time a company has to craft its
challenge.120  The procedures also give no guidance as to how the
Hearing Clerk might limit the amount of written materials or duration of
an oral hearing. 12' Despite the uncertainty surrounding the Hearing
Clerk, the FSOC determined that it would not
address these concerns regarding the particular
limitations or arrangements that generally should apply
in hearings ... [because the FSOC] expects that, in the
ordinary course of making procedural determinations,
the Hearing Clerk will coordinate with the petitioner, as
appropriate, for the purpose of facilitating an orderly
and timely hearing.' 22
While the FSOC decided against formalizing standards for the
Hearing Clerk,123 such as a minimum time period between the grant of a
hearing (written or oral) and the hearing date,1 24 the Hearing Clerk
117. THE FSOC HEARING PROCEDURES, supra note 75, § 3(c).
118. Id. §§ 4(a), 5(b)(1).
119. Id. § 3(c).
120. If the FSOC grants an oral hearing, a company most likely would have at least ten
days to submit materials because it must submit written materials "not later than 10 days
prior to the date of the oral hearing." Id. § 5(b)(3)(i).
121. See id. § 3(c).
122. FSOC Hearing Procedures, 78 Fed. Reg. 22,546, 22,548 (Apr. 16, 2013) (codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310).
123. See id.
124. See Himpler, supra note 76, at 4 ("In order to have an acceptable amount of time in
which to gather the materials, we ask that the FSOC or Hearing Clerk submit notice of the
hearing at least 60 days before the hearing is scheduled to take place.").
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should accommodate the petitioning company to the greatest extent
possible. Once the FSOC receives a request for a hearing, it must be
held within thirty days.125 At most, a petitioning company would have
sixty days to prepare for a hearing to contest a highly complex and
comprehensive designation process.126  Prudential, not surprisingly,
used all thirty days it had after receiving the notice of proposed
designation to request its hearing.127  A written or oral hearing is a
company's one opportunity to contest a designation that carries
significant regulatory burdens. In order to afford a company a
meaningful hearing, the company must have an adequate opportunity to
prepare. Therefore, in considering a hearing date and any limitations on
the amount of written material or the duration of an oral hearing, the
Hearing Clerk should cooperate and accommodate the petitioning
company to the fullest extent.
V. HOW THE FSOC's FLAWED ANALYSIS MAKES A SUCCESSFUL
CHALLENGE UNLIKELY
The FSOC's designation process is undoubtedly a complex,
comprehensive, and thorough examination of a nonbank financial
company and its potential effect on the U.S. financial system.128  The
FSOC took nearly two years to develop its final rule detailing the
designation process and three years to designate the first nonbanks as
SIFIs.129  While Prudential had "faith in the integrity of the FSOC's
review process,"' 30 the FSOC might have been reluctant to overturn its
lengthy and detailed preliminary decision.131 Prudential's challenge
was also the first test of the FSOC's substantial powers under Dodd-
125. 12 U.S.C. 5323(e)(2) (2012) ("Upon receipt of a timely request [for a hearing], [the
FSOC] shall fix a time [not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of the request].").
126. See id. ("Not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of any notice of a proposed
determination under paragraph (1), the nonbank financial company may request, in writing,
an opportunity for a written or oral hearing before [the FSOC] to contest the proposed
determination.").
127. Sarah N. Lynch, Update 2-Prudential to fight U.S. proposal to label it "systemic,"
REUTERS (July 2, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/02/gecapital-fsoc-
idUSL2N0F8 1J120130702.
128. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A (2013).
129. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,637-38 (April 11, 2012) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310); see
also Douglas, supra note 10.
130. Douglas, supra note 12 (quoting a Prudential statement).
131. Id. (citing Isaac Boltansky).
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Frank, perhaps pressuring the FSOC to stand firm on its decision.132
Moreover, the Financial Stability Board ("FSB") named Prudential as
one of nine insurers that pose a risk to the global financial system five
days before Prudential's hearing.'33 Because the FSB does not provide
company-specific explanations and the designations cannot be
challenged like those by the FSOC,134 it is unclear whether assessment
of Prudential by the FSB and the FSOC parallel each other.
Nevertheless, the FSB's designation could have provided strong ground
for the FSOC's determination that Prudential presents financial threat to
the United States. 135
The explanations for the AIG and Prudential determinations also
shed light on two primary factors that appear important to the FSOC in
making the nonbank SIFI determination, at least for insurance
companies. First, the FSOC envisions a "run-on-the-bank" scenario
where policyholders rapidly liquidated their insurance policies after a
company experiences financial distress.136  The FSOC also places
substantial weight on the size of a company in its analysis of both asset
liability channel and exposure channel.137  Given the emphasis the
FSOC placed on these two factors in its explanations for AIG and
Prudential, it appears that the FSOC is holding tight to a misguided and
narrow analytical framework.
132. Id.
133. FIN. STABILITY BOARD, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT INSURERS (G-SIIs) AND
THE POLICY MEASURES THAT WILL APPLY TO THEM, 4 (July 18, 2013); see also Elizabeth
Festa, FSOC Member: Some colleagues do not understand insurance, LIFEHEALTHPRO.COM
(Aug. 25, 2013), http://www.1ifehealthpro.com/2013/08/25/fsoc-member-some-colleagues-
do-not-understand-insu?t-gen-x-y&page=2 (noting that FSB designations cannot be
challenged); Crittenden & Scism, supra note 11.
134. See FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 133 (summarizing and providing links to the
specific framework for assessing a designation, but not detailing any particular company's
assessment).
135. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTATIONAL VOTE, VIEWS OF THE
COUNCIL'S INDEPENDENT MEMBER HAVING INSURANCE EXPERTISE, 9 (September 19, 2013)
[hereinafter INDEPENDENT MEMBER's DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION] ("Although
not binding on [the FSOC's] decision, the declaration of Prudential as a G-SII by the
FSB ... has overtaken the Council's own determination process."); see also Crittenden
&Scism, supra note 11.
136. See PRUDENTIAL FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 9-10
137. See infra Part V.B
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A. The "Run-on-the-Bank" Scenario is Firmly Entrenched in the
FSOC's Assessment
The FSOC's final determinations and explanations of
Prudential's and AIG's designations indicate that the FSOC firmly
believes that a "run-on-the-bank" scenario could occur in the insurance
industry and cripple the broader financial system.'38 In the explanation
of AIG's final determination, the FSOC repeatedly suggests a "run-on-
the-bank" scenario where AIG experiences material financial distress,
prompting policyholders to rapidly withdraw their life insurance and
annuity policies, regardless of any early withdrawal penalties. 3 9 The
FSOC believes that a "rapid liquidation of AIG's life insurance and
annuity liabilities could strain AIG's liquidity resources and compel the
company to liquidate a substantial portion of its large portfolio ....
This asset liquidation could have disruptive effects on the broader
financial markets and impair financial market functioning."1 40 Using
almost identical language, the FSOC repeats this analysis by explaining
that a large number of withdrawals and surrender requests for its life
insurance and annuity products "could strain Prudential's liquidity
resources and compel the company to sell assets in order to meet its
obligations to policy holders."' 4 1 This liquidation "could cause
significant disruptions to key markets, including corporate debt and
asset-backed securities markets." 42 As one of the two grounds for the
designation, the FSOC clearly considers the "run-on-the-bank" scenario
a viable and serious threat to the U.S. financial system.
Although this analysis is a major basis for the SIFI designation,
many industry experts strongly argue that the "run-on-the-bank"
scenario is implausible.14 3 In his dissent from Prudential's designation,
138. See PRUDENTIAL FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 9-10 ("A forced
liquidation of a significant portion of Prudential's assets ... could cause significant
disruptions to key markets."); see also AIG FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 7 ("[A]
severe and sudden liquidity stress could force AIG to sell assets in such significant volume
that these asset sales would place downward pressure on prices in certain markets, and
under more severe conditions, cause markets to seize up.").
139. AIG FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 2.
140. Id.
141. PRUDENTIAL FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 9.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Crittenden & Scism, supra note 11 ('The reasoning offered by FSOC to
justify the designation suggests a misunderstanding of the insurance business model and
regulation of insurance."' (quoting Ben Nelson, chief executive of the National Association
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voting member Edward J. DeMarco, the Acting Director of the Federal
Housing Finance Agency, noted that fundamental problem with the
FSOC's rationale is that "insurance products and liabilities are not the
same as bank deposit liabilities" with regard to withdrawals.144 For
instance, the insurance industry considers life insurance and annuity
products to be long-term liabilities because customers face strong
disincentives against cashing in their policies. 4 5  The disincentives
include "federal income tax liability, federal income tax penalties,
surrender penalties, and the loss of guarantees."l 46 Experts argue that in
light of these disincentives, policyholders do not consider life insurance
and annuity policies as cash instruments.147 Moreover, life insurance
and annuity products often have provisions that safeguard against rapid
and mass liquidation, including contractual terms and conditions allow
an insurer to defer payouts on a significant portion of immediately
payable cash surrender values. 148 The insurer can therefore responsibly
manage its asset liquidation and avoid cataclysmic devaluing in markets
like corporate debt and asset-backed securities.14 9 Additionally, state
of Insurance Commissioners)).
144. FHFA DIRECTOR'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION, supra note 54, at 2;
see also INDEPENDENT MEMBER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION, supra note 135,
at 3 (dissenting from the Prudential designation in part because there is "no support for why
such a [run-on-the-bank scenario] is warranted or reasonable); FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTATIONAL VOTE, VIEW OF DIRECTOR JOHN HUFF, THE STATE
INSURANCE COMMISSIONER REPRESENTATIVE (September 19, 2013) [hereinafter STATE
INSURANCE COMMISSIONER's DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION] (arguing that a
mass liquidation of insurance is speculative and highly unlikely); Crittenden & Scism, supra
note 11.
145. See PRUDENTIAL FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 9 ("Prudential's life
insurance and annuity products are generally considered to be long-term liabilities."); see
also AIG FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 7 ("AIG's life insurance and annuity
product reserves ... are generally considered to be long-term liabilities.").
146. STATE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION,
supra note 144, at 2.
147. See INDEPENDENT MEMBER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION, supra note
135, at 3; see also STATE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL
DETERMINATION, supra note 144, at 2 ("Most policyholders do not view insurance policies
as checking accounts, or even as typical investment accounts.").
148. INDEPENDENT MEMBER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION, supra note
135, at 4; see also STATE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL
DETERMINATION, supra note 144, at 1; INTERSTATE INSURANCE PRODUCT REGULATION
COMMISSION (IIPRC) INDIVIDUAL ANNUITY PRODUCT STANDARDS, SP029 A.L.I. - A.B.A.
313, 320 (Nov. 13-14, 2008). (noting that insurance companies must request and receive
approval before exercising contractual right to defer the payment of any general cash
surrender value for a period of not more than six months).
149. See STATE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION,
supra note 144, at 1.
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courts can impose stays on withdrawals and surrenders to protect
insurers from insolvency.15 0  The combination of policyholder
disincentives and institutional safeguards render "extraordinarily low"
the likelihood of "a contemporaneous run against the general and
separate accounts by millions of life insurance policyholders and a
significant number of annuity and other contract holders of products
with cash surrender value."' 5 1
The FSOC's reliance on "run-on-the-bank" analysis despite its
major flaws signals that a company cannot successfully challenge the
rationale in a hearing. This is evident as the FSOC counters well-
supported arguments with largely speculative and unjustified
assumptions. For instance, while the FSOC acknowledges Prudential's
right to defer payments and the state courts' authority to stay
withdrawals, it claims that a company would not seek to invoke their
rights for fear that counterparties, investors, and customers might lose
confidence in the financial stability of the company. 152 The FSOC does
not explain, however, why a company would choose insolvency through
mass liquidation rather than risk a loss in confidence by using tools
designed to buffer mass liquidation. Additionally, the FSOC does not
provide an explanation of why consumers would liquidate policies en
masse. Rather, it simply concludes "a substantial portion of [life
insurance and annuity products] are available for immediate
discretionary withdrawal with little or no penalty and therefore could, in
practice, have characteristics of short-term liabilities."15 3 When the
FSOC dismisses the strength of the mitigants and, as voting member S.
Roy Woodall, Jr. notes in his dissent, "no historical, quantitative or
qualitative evidence exists in the record that supports a run of the scale
and speed posited," 54 challenging sweeping, groundless conclusions is
nearly impossible. Consequently, a hearing appears much less
150. See INDEPENDENT MEMBER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION, supra note
135, at 4; see also STATE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL
DETERMINATION, supra note 144, at 1.
151. INDEPENDENT MEMBER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION, supra note
135, at 3.
152. See PRUDENTIAL FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 10 (discussing potential
mitigants to asset liquidation); see also AIG FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 3
(noting that the FSOC considered mitigants such as the nature of insurance products).
153. PRUDENTIAL FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 9.
154. INDEPENDENT MEMBER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION, supra note
135, at 3.
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meaningful given that the asset liquidation channel, under which the
FSOC analyzes the "run-on-the-bank" scenario, comprises a critical
portion of the FSOC's rationale for a designation.'1s
B. The FSOC Bases Designations on the Size of a Company Rather
Than Any Unique or Specific Characteristics of a Company
The regulatory guidance states that the FSOC will analyze a
company under ten statutory considerations within a six-category
framework.156 Such a diversity of factors suggests that the FSOC would
only designate a company when the company's specific risk profile
satisfies multiple factors in a substantial manner.157  However, in light
of Prudential's designation, the FSOC's analysis appears to concentrate
almost entirely on the size of a company with respect to its potential
threat to the financial stability of the United States.158  A categorical
designation process undermines the FSOC's stated analytical
framework and the "long accepted principle of [the designation process]
155. See PRUDENTIAL FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 8-10 ("A nonbank
financial company holds assets that, if liquidated quickly, would cause a fall in asset prices
and thereby significantly disrupt trading or funding in key markets."); see also 12 C.F.R. §
1310 app. A at 354 (2013) (naming the asset liquidation channel as one of three channels
"most likely to facilitate transmission of the negative effects of a nonbank financial
company's material financial distress or activities to other financial firms and markets");
AIG FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 7-8.
156. See 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A at 355-59 (naming the statutory considerations to be
(1) the extent of the leverage; (2) the extent and nature of off-balance-sheet exposures; (3)
the extent and nature of the transactions and relationships with other significant financial
companies; (4) the importance of the company as a source of credit; (5) the extent to which
assets are managed rather than owned by the company; (6)the nature, scope, size, scale,
concentration, and interconnectedness of the company; (7) the extent to which the company
is regulated; (8) the amount and nature of the company's financial assets; (9) the amount
and types of the company's liabilities; (10) and any other risk-related factors as the statutory
factors and the six-category framework to be (1) interconnectedness; (2) substitutability; (3)
size; (4) leverage; (5) liquidity risk and maturity mismatch; and (6) existing regulatory
scrutiny as the six-category framework).
157. See id. § 1310 app. A at 360 ("[The FSOC] also will consider quantitative and
qualitative information that it deems relevant to a particular nonbank financial company, as
each determination will be made on a company-specific basis." (emphasis added)).
158. See STATE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION,
supra note 144, at 2 (noting that the FSOC's exposure channel analysis "merely
demonstrates that Prudential is a large insurance company"); see also Hester Pierce, The
FSOC's Latest Careless Too Big To Fail Decision, REALCLEARMARKETS (Sept. 25, 2013),
http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2013/09/25/thefsocs_1atestLcareless toobigto
faildecision_100 632.html (arguing that the FSOC's reasoning boils down to Prudential's
size).
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that size alone is not a sufficient basis for designation."1 59
Consequently, the narrow approach taken by the FSOC severely
hampers the ability of a company to challenge its designation given that
"such a line of reasoning would inevitably lead to a conclusion that any
nonbank financial company above a certain size is a threat."160
The FSOC's designation focuses so sharply on size, in part,
because the analytical framework applies the size of the company to
nearly every statutory consideration. As seen below, the "size"
category1 6' directly applies to six out of the ten statutory considerations
that the FSOC uses to gauge a company's threat to the U.S. financial
system.162
159. STATE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION,
supra note 144, at 2; see Letter from Paul Schott Stevens, President and CEO, Inv. Co. Inst.,
to the FSOC (Feb. 25, 2011) ("A company's size alone reveals very little about its potential
to pose risk to the financial system and, consequently, could be highly misleading if
considered in isolation.").
160. INDEPENDENT MEMBER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION, supra note
135, at 2.
161. 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A at 357-58 (defining size as "the amount of financial
services or financial intermediation that a nonbank financial company provides ...
conventionally measured by the assets, liabilities, and capital of the firm . .. [and] off-sheet
assets and liabilities and assets under management").
162. Id. § 1310 app. A at 356 (providing the statutory consideration and category table).
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Statutory considerations: Category or categories in which this
consideration would be addressed:
(A) The extent of the leverage of the Leverage.
company. ..-.-.............
(B) The extent and nature of the off-balance-sheet Size; interconnectedness.
exposures of the
company....-...-.........-..-.........................................
(C) The extent and nature of the transactions and Interconnectedness
,relationshis of the company.
(D) The importance of the company as a source of credit Size; substitutability
for households, businesses, and State and local
government and as a source ofliquidity for the United
States financially system.
(E) The importance of the company as a aource of credit for Substitutability
low-income, minority, or undeserved communities, and the
impact that the failure of such company would have on the
availablisty of credit in such communities.
(F) The extent to which assets are managed rather than Size; interconnectedness;
owned by the company, and the extent to which ownership substitutability.
of assets under management is diffuse.
(0) The nature, scope, site, scale, concentration, Size; interconnectedness;
interconnectedness, and mix of activities of the company. substitutabiity.
(H) The degree to which the company is already regulated Existing regulatory scrutiny.
by I or more primary financial regulatory agencies.
(1) The amount and nature of the financial assets of the Size; interconnectedness.
(3) The amount and types of the liabilities of the company, Liquidity risk and maturity mismatch,
including the degree of reliance on short-tesm finding size; interconnectediess.
I(K) Any other risk-related factors that the Council deems Appropriate category or categoies
appropriate ..................................... based on the nature of the additional risk
related factor.
Figure 1163
In theory, the "interconnectedness" category' 64 should qualify
the "size" category by distinguishing between the large nonbank
financial companies that could potentially threaten the United States
financial system and those that could not.165  The FSOC measures
interconnectedness with quantitative standards such as
163. Id.
164. Id. § 1310 app. A at 356-57 (defining interconnectedness principally as exposures
to counterparties).
165. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial
Companies, 76 Fed. Reg. 64,265, 64,266 (proposed Oct. 18, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
1310) (stating that commenters consider "size alone ... [an insufficient] basis on which to
make a determination ... absent other considerations, such as the nonbank financial
company's interconnectedness"); see also Sean Campbell, Deputy Assoc. Dir. for Div. of
Research and Statistics, Fed. Reserve Bd., Presentation on Agenda for Measuring
Interconnectedness, at 27-33 (Apr. 6, 2012) (describing interconnectedness as a measure for
how financial distress translates into a real effect on the broader economy).
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[the] [n]umber, size, and financial strength of a nonbank
financial company's counterparties .... Aggregate
amounts of a nonbank financial company's gross or net
derivatives exposures and the number of its derivatives
counterparties .... The amount of gross notional credit
default swaps outstanding .... Total debt
outstanding ... [and] [r]einusrance obligations.166
These measurements are closely related to the size of the
company, but they target specific activities that could spread financial
distress through to other companies and the broader financial system.
Together, these two categories account for a substantial and significant
portion of the FSOC's analysis compared to the others.167
In application, the FSOC treats interconnectedness more like an
additional measure of size. In discussing the exposure channel analysis
for Prudential and AIG, the FSOC acknowledges that the individual
exposures of other financial firms to the companies are relatively
small.168  The FSOC, however, aggregates the relatively small
exposures and concludes the "exposures across multiple markets and
financial products are significant enough that material financial distress
at Prudential" could materially impact key markets through losses to
large financial firms.16 9
The FSOC's analysis contains far too many shortcomings to
constitute a major portion of the basis for a designation. Acting
Director DeMarco, a voting member, argued that because "no large
financial institution has more than a de minimus amount of its equity
capital exposed to Prudential," 70 it is just as likely, or even more likely,
that Prudential's counterparties could absorb the individual losses
without significant impact to their financial condition.' 7' Additionally,
166. 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A at 357.
167. See PRUDENTIAL FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 10-12 (noting the "critical
service or function" channel is not a factor because sufficient substitutes exists and that state
authorities already regulate Prudential).
168. See id. at 8; See AIG FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 7.
169. PRUDENTIAL FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 8.
170. FHFA DIRECTOR's DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION, supra note 54, at 1.
171. See INDEPENDENT MEMBER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION, supra note
135, at 2.
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interconnectedness presents the greatest risks when nonbank financial
company's counterparties are highly leveraged.172 Only then is it likely
that material financial distress could cause the failure of a
counterparty.' 7 3 While the FSOC acknowledges this condition, it does
not establish that any financial firms are so highly leveraged that their
exposures to Prudential could cause the kind of devastating losses that
could materially impair financial markets.174  The FSOC also
characterizes Prudential's derivatives portfolio as a source of risk to
counterparties17 5 without noting, as Acting Director DeMarco does, that
the largest component of the portfolio is interest rate swaps which "lack
the same principal and jump-to-default risk as some other derivatives
such as credit default swaps."' 7 6 The flaws in the FSOC's analysis of
interconnectedness demonstrates that the FSOC focuses simply on the
size and number of the relationships between a nonbank financial
company and its counterparties rather than company-specific
characteristics that may make transmission of material financial distress
more or less likely.
The FSOC's concentration on the size of a company also
manifests itself in the asset liquidation analysis through the "run-on-the-
bank" scenario. The underlying reason that the FSOC considers a rapid
and widespread withdrawal of Prudential's life insurance and annuity
products to be a threat to the financial system is the fact that Prudential
has $3.6 trillion of life insurance in force, $424 billion of general
account investments, and $253 billion of separate account investments,
making it the second largest life insurer in the United States. 7 7  The
analysis of a run on insurers does not consider the extremely low
probability that it would occur; rather, the FSOC assumes it will occur
then gauges the damage to financial markets that a company's forced
172. See Letter from Paul Schott Stevens, President and CEO, Investment Company
Institute, to the FSOC (Nov. 5, 2010) (discussing the FSOC's designation criteria).
173. See id. ("By contrast, in the event of the failure of a firm whose creditors are not
highly leveraged, those creditors would take a charge against their own capital, but these
events would be unlikely to spark further failures among other 'interconnected' firms.").
174. See PRUDENTIAL FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 8 (noting that "material
financial distress at Prudential could aggravate losses to large, leveraged financials firms,"
but failing to support the analysis with any facts).
175. See id. at 2.
176. FHFA DIRECTOR'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION, supra note 54, at 1.
177. See PRUDENTIAL FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 2; see also Company Fact




asset liquidation would do. Such an approach depends entirely on the
company's assets and liabilities, the traditional measure of size.' 7 8 Not
surprisingly, the FSOC is now considering MetLife, Inc. ("MetLife"),
the largest insurer in the United States, under Stage 3.179 Under the
FSOC's "run-on-the-bank" rationale, being "one of the largest financial
services companies in the United States . . . [and] among the largest
U.S. insurance companies" necessarily creates a potential threat to the
United States financial system. 80
When the FSOC bases the two most substantial portions of its
designation, the exposure channel and the asset liquidation channel,
predominantly on the size of the company, a challenge to the
designation essentially becomes futile.' 8 ' The interconnectedness
category should provide strong grounds from which to attack the
FSOC's designation as many insurance experts contend that the FSOC
misunderstands the nature of an insurance company's assets and
liabilities and how they threaten the financial stability of the United
States.182  However, the FSOC renders these arguments moot by
glossing over the detailed nature of a company's relationships with
other financial institutions and giving more weight to quantitative
analysis.' 83 If forced to argue against the FSOC's quantitative analysis
and conclusions derived from a company's size, the company will
almost certainly fail to prove that it does not pose a threat to the
financial system. 184 Likewise, a company's most effective strategy to
challenge the "run-on-the-bank" scenario and prove that asset
liquidation would not harm financial markets is that the entire scenario
178. See 12 C.F.R. § 1310 app. A at 357 (2013).
179. Press Release, Steven A. Kandarian, Chairman, President, & CEO of MetLife, Inc.,
Statement by MetLife on Reaching "Stage 3" of FSOC's SIFI Designation Process (July 16,
2013).
180. PRUDENTIAL FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 2.
181. See Elizabeth Festa, Tangled up in Pru, LIFEHEALTHPRO.COM (September 23,
2013), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2013/09/23/tangled-up-in-pru (noting that Prudential's
designation was based "run-on-the-bank" and contagion rationales despite arguments from
industry experts and members of the FSOC).
182. See, e.g., Kandarian, supra note 49, at 4 ("In MetLife's programs, approximately
three-quarters of the securities on loan are U.S. Treasuries ... which would protect
counterparties in the event of a forced sale.").
183. See generally PRUDENTIAL FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8.
184. See Woodall, supra note 13 (noting that Prudential's success hinges on its ability to
refute the FSOC's interpretation of the data and that "[iut has to be a qualitative argument"
(quoting Donald Lamson, head of the Washington, D.C. regulatory practice at Shearman &
Sterling)).
6892014]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
is highly improbable barring "a catastrophic mortality event (which
would affect the entire sector and also the whole economy).""' Yet the
validity of the scenario is entrenched in the FSOC's basis for the
designation, and by summarily dismissing the mitigating factors to asset
liquidation, 186 the question becomes simply how large are the
company's liabilities. With a disproportionate and narrow focus on size,
the FSOC's rationale potentially subjects any insurer above a certain
size, whether it is measured by life insurance and annuity liabilities or
other financial companies' exposures, to a designation.
C. A Company May Be Able to Influence the Standards by which
Nonbank SIFI Companies Will Be Regulated
Although the hearing is intended to allow a company to contest
its designation, it may also present an opportunity to communicate the
standards by which it should be regulated, if regulated at all.' 88  The
FSOC will play a significant role in defining the particular prudential
standards that the Federal Reserve will apply to nonbank SIFIs.189
Additionally, the FSOC may "differentiate among companies that are
subject to heightened standards on an individual basis or by category,
taking into consideration their capital structure, riskiness, complexity,
financial activities . . . size, and any other risk-related factors."l 90 Given
that an oral hearing might be a company's only face-to-face meeting
with the FSOC, a company should recommend regulation standards that
185. INDEPENDENT MEMBER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION, supra note
135, at 4.
186. See, e.g., PRUDENTIAL FINAL DETERMINATION, supra note 8, at 8, 10 (discussing
mitigants to rapid asset liquidation and the FSOC's rationale for why a company would not
invoke them).
187. See INDEPENDENT MEMBER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION, supra note
135, at 2 ("[S]uch a line of reasoning would inevitably lead to a conclusion that any
nonbank financial company above a certain size is a threat."); see also STATE INSURANCE
COMMISSIONER'S DISSENT ON PRUDENTIAL DETERMINATION, supra note 144, at 2 ("[T]he
Basis merely demonstrates that Prudential is a large insurance company."); Festa, supra note
181 ("Using the same rationale, other large life insurers such as MetLife ... and a number
of other life insurers over the $50 billion in assets threshold could be viewed as potential
SIFIs.").
188. Douglas, supra note 12 ("There may come a point in the proceedings where the
parties agree on a designation where the terms would be less onerous than what Prudential
fears." (quoting Donald Lamson)).
189. See 12 U.S.C. § 5325 (2012) (describing the various recommendations that the
FSOC may make in developing the prudential standards for nonbank SIFIs).
190. Id. § 5325(a)(2)(A).
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fit the company's financial and operational profile.
MetLife Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer
Steven A. Kandarian has already suggested alternative regulatory
structures.191 Kandarian has urged that regulating insurance companies
in a manner similar to banks, particularly with respect to capital
requirements, would constrain the insurance companies' ability to issue
guarantees and increase the prices of consumer products.192 A more
appropriate regulatory framework is an activities-based approach, as
opposed to an institutions-based approach, where the FSOC can monitor
certain activities and recommend tightened standards specifically for
high-risk activities to the existing primary regulator.193 MetLife may
well have the opportunity to present this framework in detail to the
FSOC as MetLife will most likely request a hearing to challenge a
proposed designation if and when the FSOC issues it. 194
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the evidentiary hearing is a nonbank financial
company's last opportunity to argue to the FSOC that it does not pose a
systemic risk to the United States financial system, the hearing does not
offer a company a meaningful forum to challenge a designation. Even
if the FSOC granted every request for an oral hearing and the Hearing
Clerk accommodated each company to the greatest extent, the hearing
procedures nevertheless constrain a company's ability to examine the
FSOC's rationale because the company cannot pose any clarifying
questions or seek additional information from the FSOC. This is
particularly troublesome with respect to the FSOC's major conclusions
that often contain scant supporting evidence. Additionally, a company
191. Kandarian, supra note 49, at 6.
192. Steven A. Kandarian, Chairman, President, and CEO, MetLife, Inc. Q2 2013
Earnings Call Transcript (Aug. 1, 2013),
http://www.morningstar.com/earnings/PrintTranscript.aspx?id=55023625.
193. Kandarian, supra note 49, at 6.
194. See Zachary Tracer, MetLife Says Regulators May Miss Key Insurer Risks with
Focus on Bank Rules, INSURANCEJOURNAL.COM (Sept. 19, 2013),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2013/09/19/305664.html (describing
MetLife's criticisms of the federal financial regulatory framework as applied to insurers);
see also Elizabeth Festa, MetLife: We're not risky, but a SIFI designation is,
LIFEHEALTHPRO.COM (April 3, 2013), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2013/04/03/metlife-
were-not-risky-but-a-sifi-designation-is (noting Kandarian's statements that MetLife is a
systemically risky company and poses not threat to the U.S. financial system).
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will have great difficulty challenging the FSOC's core conclusions with
respect to the exposure and asset liquidation channels. Although the
analytical framework suggests differently, the FSOC demonstrated in its
analysis of Prudential that it will disregard the relatively minor risks
posed by the nature of a company's assets and liabilities and instead
gauge systemic risk by the size of a company, potentially subjecting all
large insurers to a SIFI designation. However, a hearing would provide
an in-person opportunity for a company to propose alternative, industry-
tailored prudential standards that would strengthen regulation without
imposing ill-fitting burdens on designated companies.
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